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Unifying the Other
The Case of the March Violence in Kosovo and  
the Mosque Burning in Belgrade1
Marija Mandić, Belgrade
Abstract
The paper analyses the socio-political context and public discourse related to the ethnic 
and religiously motivated violence which initially occurred in Kosovo in March 2004 
and subsequently spread to Serbia. The introductory section sheds light on the history 
of the Bajrakli mosque, which is one of the oldest religious and cultural monuments pre-
served in Belgrade up to the present time. The paper further reveals historical and de-
mographic data on the Muslim population in Serbia and Belgrade. Finally, it focusses on 
the events and discourses in Kosovo and Serbia which eventually led to setting the only 
Belgrade mosque ablaze. By applying methods of critical discourse analysis and media 
analysis, the Serbian public discourse related to the March riots and the mosque arson is 
analysed. In this paper, I argue that the strategy of unifying the Other appeared to be a 
very effective means of mobilizing people en masse in both Kosovo and Serbia.
Introduction: history and present situation of the mosque
Belgrade was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for more than three hundred years 
with short breaks, in the period from 1521 to 1867. The first half of this pe-
riod passed peacefully, while in the course of the following hundred and fifty 
years the city was changing hands three times between the Ottomans and the 
Habsburgs (Đurić-Zamolo 1977: 6). Under Ottoman rule, Belgrade represented 
an important political, cultural, and economic Muslim centre, wherein many 
Christian churches were converted into mosques and numerous large and rep-
resentative mosques were built. The sources from this period are rather scarce, 
however, according to Fotić: “By 1560, there were 16 mosques and mescids 
registered, in 1572 there were as many as 24 and at the end of the century, at 
least 29. In the seventeenth century, at least 29 mosques and 12 mescids were 
built, which would make about 70 mosques and mescids in all. Evliya Celebi 
1 This paper is part of the Language, Folklore, Migrations in the Balkans project (no. 148011) 
that is carried out at the SASA Institute for Balkan Studies in Belgrade and financed by the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. 
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claims that there were 270 mihrabs (houses of worship) and as many mektebs, 
33 mosques and 19 mescids included. The total number is undoubtedly exagger-
ated. According to Šabanović, in Evliya’s time (1660) or later there could not 
have been more than 80 mosques and mescids” (Čelebi 1967, Šabanović 1970 
cited in Fotić 2005: 61).2
In addition, there were several churches, both Orthodox and Catholic, and 
some synagogues in Belgrade during Ottoman rule (Fotić 2005: 65, 72). In 
1660, Evliya Celebi mentions nine Orthodox (Greek, Armenian, Serbian, and 
Bulgarian) and Jewish “houses of worship” (Čelebi 1967: 90). However, Celebi 
was not well informed about the Orthodox institutional organization and about 
divisions among Christians, so one should take these figures with reserve.
At the time when the Habsburg army controlled Belgrade in the 17th (1688–
1690) and 18th century (1717–1739, 1789–1791), the city’s landscape changed 
drastically. As Fotić (2008: 89) explains, “heavy bombardments during numer-
ous sieges, from both sides, damaged the city to such an extent that it took dec-
ades to rebuild”. In 1688, Belgrade was wrested from the Ottomans for the first 
time. After this takeover, only 15 mosques remained in Belgrade (Đurić-Zamolo 
1977: 59). During the second Habsburg rule in Belgrade (1717–1739), there was 
an effort to erase all Muslim symbols: “hammams, mosques and mektbes were 
used mainly as warehouses. Some mosques were converted into Roman-Cath-
olic churches, and one mosque was even used as a comedy theatre” (Tričković 
1995: 124 [transl. by author]). Then again, when the Ottomans recaptured the 
city, they repaired the mosques, destroying the newly erected churches on the 
occasion or converting them into mosques (Tričković 2013: 445).
During the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman Empire (1804–1813), 
Belgrade was captured in 1806 by Karađorđe, the leader of the Uprising, and 
his followers, wherein many mosques and other objects typical of Islamic tradi-
tional culture were destroyed. In 1813, the Ottomans quashed the Uprising, re-
gained control over the city and repaired many mosques. After the Second Ser-
bian Uprising in 1815, Serbia reached semi-independence and Belgrade became 
the Serbian capital. In the inventory made by the Serbian authorities in 1836, 
there were 16 mosques in Belgrade. Fotić (2008: 89) describes this transitory pe-
riod in the following manner: “During the first half of the century, the city had 
a joint Serbian and Ottoman civil government, with an Ottoman garrison in the 
fortress. After another Ottoman-Serbian conflict in 1862, and following intense 
diplomatic efforts, the last Ottoman garrison left Belgrade in 1867. Fearing that 
2 Mihrab – semicircular niche in the wall of a mosque indicating the direction of the Kabba 
in Mecca which Muslims are turned to when praying; mescid – small mosque; mekteb – Is-
lamic elementary school.
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they would be without protection in a Christian-controlled Serbia, the remaining 
Muslim population of Belgrade also left with the Ottoman army.”
The moving out of the Turks, Slavic Muslims and other Balkan Muslims 
from Belgrade in 1867 led to the destruction of almost all the remaining Bel-
grade mosques. By the end of the 19th century, the only remaining mosque was 
the Bajrakli Mosque. Serbian noblemen chose to protect this particular mosque 
as the only place of Muslim worship in Belgrade because of its good condition 
(cf. Hadžić 1957). This should have proved that the new Serbian political elite 
harbored no hostility towards Muslim citizens.
The Bajrakli Mosque is located at no. 11 Gospodar Jevremova Street in 
Dorćol, one of the oldest parts of central Belgrade. It represents the Ottoman 
architectural style and consists of a single dome. The Bajrakli Mosque kept the 
time for all other mosques in Belgrade, as one of the largest and oldest mosques. 
It gave the time according to the Islamic or Hijri calendar (it began in AD 622 
when the Prophet Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina, which is known 
as Hijra); the mosque had a clock and the flag (Turk. bayrak) which marked the 
prayer time for all other mosques in Belgrade (cf. Đurić-Zamolo 1977, Hadžić 
1957). The mosque had the good fortune of avoiding the destruction and plun-
der of the two world wars. During the 1990s and the violent ethnic conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia, the mosque and its worshippers managed more or less to 
avoid conflict situations. Until the March riots in Kosovo in 2004, the religious 
and social life in the mosque continued in its quiet and almost hidden manner.
Nowadays, it is the only practising mosque with a minaret in Belgrade. In-
side the mosque court, there is a madrasah with a dormitory for pupils, the re-
cently founded Faculty of Islamic Studies, and the centre for information and 
cultural events related to the Muslim community of Belgrade. In addition, there 
is the administrative centre of the Islamic Community of Serbia (Serb. Islamska 
zajednica Srbije), which is one of two parallel Serbian Islamic communities.3 
The Muslims in Belgrade also gather in more than 15 mescids all over Belgrade, 
e. g. Borča, Zemun, Novi Beograd, Palilula, Čukarica, Vračar, Savski Venac, 
3 The other one is named the Islamic Community in Serbia (Serb. Islamska zajednica u 
 Srbiji) with its seat in Novi Pazar, a town located in the southwest region of Serbia. At 
the moment, two communities are embroiled in a harsh dispute over primacy. The dispute 
arose in 2006 and 2007 and ever since has been highly politicized, with many different 
political interests, actors and views involved. The current state of affairs can be described 
as a frozen conflict which escalates from time to time. It is noteworthy to mention that the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish religious leader have recently put ef-
fort into reconciling the two fractions: Peščanik website: http://pescanik.net/izs-vs-izus 
-re tro spektiva; the Blic daily: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/476453/Turska-ne-od us 
taje -od -pomirenja-dve-islamske-zajednice-u-Srbiji/komentari/12697131/komentar-odgovor 
(visited on 23. 1. 2015).
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Mladenovac, etc. In 2014, a mescid was also established in the Serbian Army 
headquarters in order to meet the religious needs of the Muslim soldiers.4 Since 
the worshippers are of different ethnic origin, the next section briefly presents 
the demographic picture of the Muslim population in Serbia.
Belgrade Muslims: demographics and censuses of population
This section presents the demographic data collected via state censuses. It aims 
to illustrate ethnic heterogeneity and regional dispersion of the Muslim popu-
lation in Serbia. The question on religion was asked in the Censuses of 1953, 
1991, 2002 and 2011. In the 1953 Census, the question was formulated as the 
“Affiliation with religion”, whereby the person with certain religious conviction 
ought to have written down the religion she/he confesses, while the person who 
had no religious conviction ought to have filled in: without religion. In the pe-
riod between 1953 and 1991, this question was omitted in the Socialist Federa-
tive Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for ideological reasons. Since 1991, there 
has been a question on religion but the respondent has not been under obliga-
tion to declare him/herself (cf. the 2011 census). In contemporary Serbia, reli-
gious life and freedom of religious conviction are guaranteed and regulated by 
the Serbian Constitution (CONST 2006) and the Law on Churches and Religious 
Communities (Law 2006).5 In the 2011 Census, three “identity questions” were 
asked, formulated as open-type questions: (1) national affiliation, (2) religion, 
(3) mother tongue.6
According to the last, 2011 Census, Serbia’s total population was 7 186 862 
inhabitants, out of whom 6 079 396 (84.59 % of the total population) declared 
4 Website of Mešihat islamske zajednice Sanžaka: http://www.mesihatsandzaka.rs/vijes 
ti/941-otvoren-mesdzid-u-generalstabu-vojske-srbije.html (visited on 23. 1. 2015).
5 The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Law 2006), however, was criticized for 
giving privileges to the traditional religious communities (Serbian Orthodox Church, Ro-
man Catholic Church, Slovak Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession, Protestant 
Christian Church, Evangelical Christian Church, Jewish Community, Islamic Commu-
nity), while discriminating against non-traditional and small religious communities; see: 
http://pescanik. net/diskriminacija-s-predumisljajem; Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe: http://www.osce.org/serbia/47280 (visited on 23. 1. 2015).
6 The legal instructions given to the enumerators said that, according to the Serbian Consti-
tution (CONST 2006), citizens were not obliged to declare themselves in terms of their re-
ligion or ethnicity. The 2011 Census allowed responses with double declaration of the eth-
nicity (Serb-Montenegrin, Macedonian-Serb, etc.) for the first time. As regards religion, 
it is not clear whether it refers to active or traditional believers, that is, the religion their 
parents or the family belonged to through generations (Census 2011: 12).
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themselves as Orthodox Christians, as Roman Catholics 356 957 (4.97 %), as 
Protestants 71 284 (0.99 %), as Muslims 222 828 (3.1 %), as belonging to Ju-
daism 578 (0.01 %), and almost five percent either did not wish to answer this 
question or declared a religious conviction which could not be identified, etc. 
In Belgrade, the total population was 1 659 440, out of whom there were Ortho-
dox Christians 1 475 168 (88.9 %), Roman Catholics 13 720 (0.83 %), Protestants 
3 128 (0.19 %), Muslims 31 914 (1.92 %), belonging to Judaism 295 (0.02 %); al-
most five percent of the respondents did not declare their religious conviction 
or declared one which could not be identified, etc. (2011 Census). As Susan Gal 
argues (1993: 338), the census-taking practice always prompts debates about 
the classifications adopted or discarded and the relationship between political, 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic categories established via censuses by governing 
elites. It is, as Foucault (1994) would name it, a “technology of power” that not 
only records but also contributes to creating identities by providing categories 
for enumeration. The census-taking practice is even more disputable in socie-
ties traumatized by wars and ethnic conflicts. That is how one can understand 
that the number of Belgrade Muslims is estimated as six or seven times larg-
er than the censuses show. In an interview in 2007, Belgrade mufti Muhamed 
Jusufspahić estimated the number of Belgrade Muslims at between 180 000 and 
200 000.7
The respondents who declared Muslim religion are very diverse by national-
ity. The most numerous group are Bosniaks, who make up 64.9 % of the Mus-
lim population, 16.4 % are Roma, 9.3 % are Muslims (as “national” or “eth-
nic” affiliation), 3.2 % Gorani, 1.9 % Albanians, 1.2 % Serbs, 0.8 % Egyptians, 
2.4 % other (Đurić et al. 2014: 188). There is almost an absolute correspond-
ence between ethnic and religious identification among Bosniaks (99.51 %) and 
Muslims (as “national” affiliation) (93 %), while 71 % of Albanians and 25 % of 
Roma declared themselves as Muslims (Đurić et al. 2014: 188–193).8
The issue of Muslim nationality was particularly politicized in the former 
Yugoslavia. In the 1948 Census, it was proposed that Muslims of Yugoslav ori-
gin ought to have given one of the following answers: “Serb-Muslim”, “Croat-
Muslim” etc. or “undeclared-Muslim”; in the 1953 Census, they were classified 
as “Yugoslavs undeclared”, alongside with other persons of Yugoslav origin who 
did not declare themselves; since the 1961 Census, a new modality has been in-
troduced – “Muslims (national or ethnic affiliation)”; in the 2002 Census, an 
7 The Radio Television of Serbia website: http://www.rts.rs//page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru %C5 
%A1 tvo/26578/Muslimani+u+Beogradu+traže+svoje+groblje.html (visit 28. 1.  2015).
8 For more about the Muslim believers in Serbia see e. g.: Mušović 1996; Bašić 2002; Bašić, 
Jakšić 2005; Albanci 2003; Živković 2007; Džudžević 2007; Đorđević 2007; Ahmetović 
2000.
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additional modality was added, namely – Bosniak. Consequently, the Muslims 
of Yugoslav origin mainly declared their ethnicity either as Bosniak or Muslim 
(national or ethnic affiliation) in the 2011 Census.
National minorities in Serbia are regionally distributed: Bosniaks and Mus-
lims (national or ethnic affiliation) are concentrated in South-Western Serbia, 
in the region historically known as Sandžak.9 Albanians are concentrated in the 
South of Serbia, in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa. One 
fifth of the Serbian Roma live in the Belgrade area, and they are predominantly 
Muslim (57 %) (Đurić et al. 2014: 192–193). In one of the interviews, the Bel-
grade mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić highlighted that one of the obstacles to Mus-
lim unity in Serbia could be seen in the attempts of regional Muslim centres to 
achieve religious unity on the basis of common ethnic identity. In contrast to 
that, the Belgrade Muslim centre is a multi-ethnic one and none of the ethnic 
groups is dominant (Nedeljni telegraf, 11. 4. 2007).
The March violence in Kosovo
The following section presents the events which occurred in Kosovo in March 
2004. It shows how the media – Serbian, Albanian and global news media like 
CNN – contributed to the spread of violence by circulating unconfirmed or 
even false news in which the blame for the accidents was put on the criminal-
ized Other. The unrest in Kosovo broke out on 17 March 2004, being the worst 
outbreak of violence in the province since the Kosovo War of 1998–99 and the 
NATO intervention. It initially began on 15 March 2004, when an 18-year-old 
Serb was critically wounded in the drive-by shooting carried out allegedly by 
Albanians in the village of Čaglavica, on the outskirts of Priština, central Ko-
sovo. On the same day, the boy’s co-villagers and the Serbian people from the 
surrounding villages organized protests (Gračanica, Sušica, Laplje Selo, Pre-
oce). KFOR attempted to quell the Serbian rioting by raiding the rebelling vil-
lages; in response, the protesters blocked the main roads to Skopje and Gnjilane. 
The Serbian press wrote that “Albanian extremists were shooting from firearms 
9 Тhe name Sandžak derives from the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a former Ottoman administra-
tive district. However, this region was a centre of the Medieval Serb Kingdom the capital of 
which was once the city of Ras. Therefore, the other historical name used when referring 
to this region is Raška. Sanjak is more usual among both Muslim and Orthodox population, 
while Raška is mostly used by the Orthodox population (cf. King Savić 2012, Merdjanova 
2013).
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with suppressors” (Politika, 16. 3. 2004).10 However, who actually attacked the 
18-years old boy has remained unsolved until this day.
On 16 March, two Albanian children drowned in the Ibar River in the village 
of Čabar, close to the Serbian municipality of Zubin Potok. CNN was among the 
first to broadcast the story about “Serbs who, with their dogs, pursued the Al-
banian boys”, although CNN had received a statement from the UN Mission in 
Kosovo that the deaths of Albanian boys were most probably a result of an ac-
cident.11 The Albanian news agencies in Kosovo reported that the children were 
chased into the river by “Serbian bandits” with a dog who sought revenge for 
the Serbian boy who had been wounded on the previous day. Although the claim 
about the involvement of the Serbs in the incident was not proven, it sparked 
Albanian riots all over the province. By portraying the incident as a brutal and 
ethnically motivated crime, the Albanian-language media provoked furious and 
violent reactions among the local Albanian population (HRW; OSCE Report 
2004).12 In the OSCE Media Analysis 2004, it was explicitly stated: “In par-
ticular, TV journalists and their editors failed to behave according to the ethics 
of their profession, acted emotionally and put their ‘patriotic’ duty, as they saw 
it, first.”13
All violent incidents which followed occurred in less than 72 hours. During 
the days to come, large Albanian crowds attacked Serb and other non-Albanian 
communities, whereby 19 people were killed (eleven Kosovo Albanians, eight 
Kosovo Serbs), more than 900 persons were injured (including 65 international 
police officers and 58 Kosovo police officers), and more than 800 buildings de-
stroyed or damaged (including 29 churches or monasteries). By one estimate, 
more than 50 000 people participated in the riots. The March violent unrest also 
led to the expulsion or displacement of 4 100 Serbs, Roma, Ashkali (Albanian-
speaking Roma), and other non-Albanians from their homes (cf. OSCE Report 
2005; CRDP).14 As concluded in the Human Rights Watch Report: “The fail-
ure – almost collapse – of the security institutions in Kosovo during the March 
10 In the Serbian original: headline “Teško povređen Jovica Ivić”, lead “Albanski esktremisti 
pucali iz vatrenog oružja sa prigušvačem” (Politika, 17. 3. 2004, p. A8).
11 Portal Free Republic: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1102177/posts (visited on 
10. 6. 2015).
12 Human Rights Watch Report: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/5.htm, http://
www.osce.org/ fom/30265?download=true (visited on 27. 1. 2015).
13 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: http://www.osce.org/fom/30265 
?down load=true (p. 15) (visited on 27. 1. 2015).
14 OSCE: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/32700; Centre for Research, Documentation and Pub-
lication (CRDP): http://crdp-ks.org/en/programs/dealing-with-the-past (visited 23. 1. 2015), 
Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/3.htm, Calic 2005: 
https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/getFull PDF/21929 (visited on 23. 1. 2015).
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violence is beyond dispute” (HRW).15 The media and expert reports depicted 
this violent outbreak as “ethnic cleansing” (BBC), “Anti-Minority” and “Anti-
Serb violence” (Washington Times; HRW).16
International officials claimed that the violence was not so spontaneous, but 
that there were some extremist organizations behind it with a ready-made plan 
to act. Moreover, the highest-ranking world and European politicians, officers 
and institutions – like Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy repre-
sentative, Admiral Gregory Johnson, Commander of NATO forces for Southern 
Europe, UN Security Council, and Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, issued 
statements in which they described the violence as an organized and targeted 
campaign by some radical members of Albanian parties and the paramilitary 
forces. A careful analysis shows, though, that this violence was both spontane-
ous and organized. Namely, it revealed deep frustrations of young Albanians 
facing crippling corruption, stagnating economy, and criminalization of the Ko-
sovo society (HRW).17
Setting mosque on fire as “act of revenge”?
In response to the Kosovo riots, thousands of people protested in several Serbian 
cities in the night between 17 and 18 March, wherein mosques in Belgrade, Niš 
and Zvornik (eastern Bosnia) were set on fire and the windows of the Islamic 
Community headquarters in Novi Sad were smashed. In addition, small shops 
and grocery stores belonging to Belgrade Muslims were demolished, along with 
McDonald’s restaurants and UN vehicles parked in central Belgrade.
Large crowds of people gathered around the Belgrade mosque on March 17, 
as young extremists – many of them with criminal records – set it on fire. The 
policemen claimed that they had tried to protect the mosque but it had not been 
possible because of the large crowd that had flocked to the area. Amfilohije 
Radović, Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was seen on the spot 
trying to prevent rioters from demolishing the mosque. It was discovered later 
that the police received an order all of a sudden to withdraw from the place. The 
Bajrakli Mosque was severely damaged; a library with more than 7 000 invalu-
15 Human Rights Watch Report: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/6.htm (visit-
ed on 27. 1. 2015).
16 BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3551571.stm; Washington Times: http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2005/apr/9/20050409-102733-9741r/; Human Rights Watch Re-
port 2004: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/2.htm (visited on 26. 1.  2015).
17 Human Rights Watch Report 2004: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/7.htm 
(visited on 27. 1. 2015).
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able books and a documentation centre were devoured by fire. In the very same 
night, the Islam-Aga Mosque in Niš was set on fire. The mosque was built in 
1720 and was protected as cultural heritage since 1954. Overall, 178 people were 
arrested in Serbia during the riots. The police chiefs in Belgrade and Niš were 
dismissed over accusations of failure to protect the mosques. Since then, the Ba-
jrakli Mosque has been protected by the police day and night. The mosques in 
Belgrade and Niš were subsequently restored with the aid of donations by the 
Government of Serbia and the City of Belgrade, the USAID, and the Govern-
ment of Azerbaijan. The day of the mosque burning was proclaimed Day of the 
Mosques by the Islamic Community of Serbia, and since 2007 was celebrated 
on March 18. The Serbian authorities, on the other hand, declared the Day of 
Mourning on March 21 to mark “the pogrom against ethnic Serbs, the burning 
of the Serbian churches and homes in Kosovo and Metohija” (Blic, 21. 3. 2004).18
The Serbian public discourse
In the following sections I will focus on the Serbian public discourse about the 
March riots. My understanding of discourse is derived from Foucault (1972: 38), 
who takes the rules of discourse formation so as to explain the ways of consti-
tuting forms of subjectivity, knowledge, social practices, institutions and power 
relations. In line with this, critical discourse analysts consider discourse and so-
ciety as constituting one another, and investigate social inequality which is con-
structed and legitimized via discourse (van Dijk 2001; Fairclough 2001; Fair-
clough, Wodak 1997). The concept of discursive strategy, also employed in the 
paper, generally denotes a more or less accurate plan adopted to achieve a cer-
tain political, psychological or other kind of objective (Wodak et al. 2009: 31). 
The most salient strategies used by Serbian media were victimization and justifi-
cation of “us”, on the one hand, and criminalization and unification of different 
“other” groups, on the other hand. The unification of different “other” groups 
is based on a minimal set of distinctive markers (cf. Belova 2003: 162).19 In this 
case, different ethnic groups are united on the basis of their religion, Islam.
In most European states Muslims are either immigrants or have immigrant 
backgrounds, while in Southeast Europe there are many indigenous ethnic 
18 In Serbian original: headline “Danas Dan žalosti”, article “Vlada Republike Srbije, zbog 
najnovijeg pogroma Srba i spaljivanja srpskih svetinja i domova na Kosovu i Metohiji, pro-
glasila je 21. mart 2004. godine za dan žalosti” (Blic, 21. 3. 2004, p. 3).
19 In this way, in the discourse of Russian peasants, it was possible to equate Turks, Tartars 
and Jews with each other on the basis of just one distinctive feature – the removal of pork 
from their diets (cf. Belova 2005: 162).
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groups whose confession is Islam (Voss, Telbizova-Sack 2010). Namely, Islam 
spread in this part of Europe when it was under the Ottoman control from the 
14th to the 19th century. Today, the unification of different ethnic groups on the 
basis of their Islamic faith, however, is typical for Western policy and media. 
Triandafylidou (2010: 5) remarks that in the European Union “in particular, Is-
lam has become a politically, culturally and symbolically important dimension 
of difference that it often overshadows ethnicity”. She also notes that “the pres-
ence of Muslimophobia and Islamophobia in the various national cases […] sug-
gests that the internal diversity and richness of Muslim communities have be-
come obscured by such generalizing discourses and blanket policies” (ibid., 15; 
cf. Erdenir 2010). Moreover, since 9/11, Western media have tended to stereo-
type Muslims within the War on Terrorism frame which had replaced the older 
Cold War frame in American foreign policy (Kern et al. 2003: 296). As Norris 
et al. (2003: 15) put it, “the use of the terrorism frame serves several functions 
both cognitive, by linking together disparate facts, events, and leaders, and also 
evaluative, by naming perpetrators, identifying victims, and attributing blame. 
It allows political leaders to communicate a coherent, simple message to the pub-
lic, while also reshaping perceptions of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’”.
The War on Terrorism frame was exactly the card the Serbian authorities 
and media tried to play when portraying the March violence in Kosovo as acts 
of terrorism. However, the Serbian public sphere was not united with regard to 
these events. Namely, three “voices”, i. e., ideological positions, in the Serbian 
public can be distinguished between: resistance, silence, and commemoration.
The media on the March riots
Critical media analysis tends to reveal societal power operations and calls for 
social responsibility (Cotter 2003: 417). In particular, I tend to critically analyze 
headlines from the largest circulated national dailies in Serbia – Večernje no vos­
ti (VN), Politika (P), Blic (B), Kurir (K), and Danas (D). By doing so, I would 
like to call for social responsibility of the Serbian authorities and media for the 
emergence of violence in the Serbian streets and burning of the mosques after 
the violence in Kosovo occurred.
The mentioned dailies (re)produce national agenda and, at the same time, 
function as a record for society (Cotter 2003: 416). According to Fairclough 
(2001), mass media discourse recreates societal power relations which are re-
flected in the way they construct the reader, subject, select information, make 
sourcing, lexical choices, and evaluation. Access to news media is available 
mostly to privileged and powerful social groups. Thus, media are used to mobi-
lize the public to support the social interests of the elite or whoever stands be-
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hind the media industry (Pasha 2011: 64, 2015). In the Serbian media sphere, 
Politika is considered to be the most respected and credible newspaper in the 
country; the evening newspaper Večernje novosti belongs to the newspapers 
with the highest circulation in the country; Blic is also one of the most popu-
lar newspapers, more or less profiled as a tabloid; Kurir is a tabloid newspaper 
with a very high circulation. All mentioned dailies are mainly expressing and 
advocating the views of the ruling establishment. On the other hand, Danas is 
a left-wing oriented daily and the only newspaper among the mentioned with a 
critical editorial policy towards the ruling regime. Since the analytical focus in 
this paper is set upon headlines, I will draw attention to some underlying char-
acteristics of headlines. Namely, headlines enjoy a privileged position reflected 
in a distinct layout and typography, they are syntactically impoverished, and of-
ten ambiguous, but they frame the news in a very specific way (Metila 2013: 
72–73, Perfetti et al. 1987: 692). Headlines not only summarize the news, rather 
they highlight some specific aspects of the story in order to attract readers or to 
trigger frames and belief systems in the reader’s mind (Bell 1991: 187–189, Dor 
2003: 697–717). It is noteworthy to mention that headlines have a very high im-
pact on the audience, since most readers rather scan the headlines and leads than 
read the whole stories; thus, the only information that readers often get about a 
story comes through its headline.
The violence against the Serbs in Kosovo was also almost the only topic on 
March 18 and 19, i. e., the entire issues – from the cover to the last page, report-
ed almost exclusively about those incidents. In this paper, I quote the selected 
headlines from March 17 to 26. The special emphasis is placed on March 17, 
18 and 19, which are presented in Table 1; the Serbian original headlines are 
provided in the Appendix at the end of the paper. Along with deeply disturbing 
stories about killed and expelled Serbian civilians and burned churches, there 
were also articles about riots all over Serbia and burned mosques, but they were 
placed on the back pages and thus marginalised. Moreover, from the first day, 
the strategy of the government-controlled media was to establish a direct link 
between the violence in Kosovo and global “Islamic” terrorism.
On March 18, the cover pages were reserved for the violence against Serbs 
in Kosovo. The participants were generalized and ethnically categorized. Serbs 
were construed as a unified passive subject suffering violence and terror. Be-
sides, “everything Serbian” and Kosovo as a region were victimized. Albani-
ans were constructed as a unified violent and criminal Other. The events in Ko-
sovo were labelled as acts of terrorism or depicted in metaphors of blood and 
war (e. g. Albanians Attacking Serbs: Kosmet Soaked in Blood, VN; Onslaught 
Against Everything Serbian, VN; Terror Against Serbs, B; Terrorism by Kosovo 
Albanians in Kosmet, B; WAR: In Organized Attacks of Albanians Against Serbs 
Across Kosovo, K). In Politika, however, the headline tended to avoid ethnic cat-
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egorization, criminalization, and evaluation (e. g. Seven People Killed in Clash­
es). But only Danas put a report on the events both in Kosovo and Serbia on 
the cover page (e. g. Bloody Clashes Across Kosovo, Violence in Streets of Bel­
grade, D); Moreover, Danas prioritized events in Serbia by publishing a photo 
of the burning Belgrade mosque on the cover.
Although the main Serbian newspapers reported about the events both in 
Kosovo and in Serbia, the violence in the Serbian streets was marginalised. On 
March 18, Večernje novosti published, in the middle of the issue, the article Bel­
grade Still Sleeps, in which the fact that not many Belgrade citizens had rioted 
the previous night was criticized: “only a few thousand people in the streets of 
Belgrade”. On the same page, there were two reports on the arson of the Bel-
grade mosque with a statement by Belgrade Mayor Radmila Hrustanović, who 
strongly condemned the incident and stressed that it happened because the police 
did not want to break up the riots forcefully. A few pages after that, there was 
also a report about the events in Niš, with an explanation that the Niš mosque 
was burned by “outraged citizens of Niš” (VN). The headlines of the Večernje 
novosti were de-agentivized by means of impersonal or passive constructions 
(e. g. Mosque Set on Fire in Belgrade Riots; Mosque is Burned, Eight Policemen 
Wounded, VN). The headlines with no explicated agent serve the strategy of di-
minishing the real responsibility. In Blic, the stories about the riots in Belgrade 
and Niš were placed on page 12 within the article: Solidarity with Persecuted, 
and the small framed text on the same page with the headline: Bajrakli Mosque’s 
Burning, which obviously lacked agency. In the middle of the issue, a new series 
of articles on the global Islamic terrorism was initiated (B, 18 March). Howev-
er, only Danas gave parallel articles about the events in Kosovo and the events 
in Serbia throughout the whole issue, with particular emphasis on the burned 
mosques (D, 18 March).
On 19 March, the covers were dedicated to the Serbian suffering and vic-
tims (e. g. Kosovo is not Surrendering, VN; Everything Serbian Burning, They 
Killed, Burned and Beat, Ethnic Cleansing, They Burned All Houses, Serbs in 
Refuge, B). However, the Kurir had the most disturbing and alarming headline 
labelling the actions against the Serbs as slaughter and using the imperative verb 
form to address the public and call it to go out and react (e.g. Slaughter of Serbs 
in Kosovo and Metohija: Stand Up Serbia!, K). On page 5, the Kurir delivered 
articles with headlines quoting Vuk Drašković, Foreign Minister of Serbia and 
Montenegro: Send Army to Kosovo, and Army General Vladimir Lazarević: 
Fight Fire with Fire. These headlines and related articles advocated a Serbi-
an military campaign against the Kosovo Albanians. The cover of Politika ap-
peared with the headline: Serbs in Anxiety and Fear, while a headline on page 6 
read: Crystal Night in Kosovo and Metohija, associating the violence against the 
Serbs with the Nazi atrocities against the Jews in 1938.
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On the same day, the reports on the mosques set on fire were again published 
on the back pages and marginalised. In Večernje novosti, page 10 had articles 
entitled: Passions Burned Mosque, and: Those Accountable Must Be Found. The 
agents were either abstract – passions – or generalized – those accountable. In 
the middle of Blic, however, there were reports on the mosques and the Mus-
lim shops incidents in Serbia, with titles: Vandals Only Harm Serbia, and also: 
Government of Serbia to Repair Bajrakli Mosque. In Kurir, page 6 was dedicat-
ed to the events in Belgrade, i. e., there was an interview with the Mufti of Bel-
grade, Hamdija Jusufspahić: “Protect Muslims: We are not to blame for what 
is happening to Serbs; we are good citizens.” Politika published an article on 
page 6 entitled: Bajrakli Flame with an article stating that an act like this could 
have been expected bearing in mind what had happened in Kosovo, whereas on 
page 9, Politika published an article: Islam­Aga Mosque Burned Down. “Many 
displaced persons from Kosmet went out on the streets of Niš”, the lead of which 
implied that the burning had been carried out by the Serbs displaced from Ko-
sovo, and thus justified it.
Table 1. Headlines in Serbian dailies on March 17, 18, and 19 referring to the March riots in 
Kosovo and the burning of mosques in Belgrade and Niš.
Večernje novosti
March 17: Cover: Gunfire AGAinst Protest; Middle (p. 14): they shoot At 
Children AGAin.
March 18: Cover: serbiA on its feet; Albanians are after Serbs in Kosovska 
Mitrovica and Other Serbian Enclaves; Kosmet soAKed in blood; (Cover, up-
per right-hand corner with a small photo) Bajrakli Mosque Set on Fire in Bel-
grade Protests. Middle (p. 21–25): Hooligans on Streets, Too (p. 21); Bajrakli 
Mosque Set on Fire (p. 21); Onslaught Against Everything Serbian (p. 24–25). 
Special edition of VN: Cover: serbiA is risinG. Middle (p. 6–11): Serbian Homes 
on Fire (p. 6); Kosovska Mitrovica: whole City on its feet (p. 8–9); belGrAde 
still sleePs (p. 11); Mosque Set on Fire in Belgrade: mosque on fire (p. 12); In 
Centre of Niš, due to Kosovo Events: mosque burned (p. 15).
March 19: Cover: Kosovo is not surrenderinG; Middle (p. 10): Those Account-
able Must be Found (p. 10), Passions Burned Mosque (p. 10).
Blic
March 17: Middle (p. 10): Thousands of Serbs Protesting.
March 18: Cover: Terror against Serbs. Terrorism by Albanians in Kosmet. First 
part (p. 4–5): Days of Blood in Kosovo. Middle (p. 12): Solidarity with Perse-
cuted: (small boxed text) Bajrakli Mosque Was Burning.
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March 19: Cover: BURNING Everything Serbian. First part (p. 2–7): They 
Killed, Burned and Beat (p. 2–3); Ethnic Cleansing (p. 5); They Burned all 
Houses, Serbs in Refuge (p. 6). Middle (p. 9): Bajrakli Mosque Demolished and 
Burned. Vandals Only Harm Serbia; Government of Serbia to Repair Bajrakli 
Mosque.
Kurir
March 17: Middle (p. 7): Clay Pigeons.
March 18: Cover: WAR: More than Ten Killed, and Almost 300 Wounded in 
Organized Attacks of Albanians against Serbs across Kosovo.
March 19: Cover: Slaughter of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. STAND UP 
SERBIA! First half (p. 2–8): it’s enouGh! (p. 2); PoGrom of serbs! (p. 3); Vuk 
Drašković: Send Army to Kosovo! (p. 5); Lazarević: Fight Fire with Fire (p. 5). 
Interview with Mufti of Belgrade, Hamdija Jusufspahić (p. 6); Mufti: Protect 
Muslims. We are not to blame for what is happening to Serbs, we are good cit-
izens (p. 6); Obradović: Police is to blame for mosque burning (p. 8). Middle 
(p. 12–13): GENOCIDE! Serbian Public Revolted Because of Lynch in Kosmet, 
but Also Condemns Burning of Muslim Temples.
Politika
March 17: Middle (p. A8): Jovica Nikolić heavily injured. Albanian extremists 
were shooting from firearms with suppressors.
March 18: Cover: Seven People Killed in Clashes. Middle (p. A8): Violence 
Planned in Advance. Albanian Extremists not in Favor of Negotiations. Last 
page: Several Thousand Citizens Protested in front of Serbian Government 
Building. Solidarity with Serbs in Kosmet. (small article): Dozen Policemen In-
jured, Mosque Burned.
March 19: Cover: Day after Worst Outbreak of Violence in Post-War Kosmet. 
Serbs in Anxiety and Fear. Middle (p. A6): Crystal Night in Kosovo and Metohi-
ja. Spring of Serbian Despair; Bajrakli Flame. Back (p. A9): Islam-Aga Mosque 
Burned Down. Many displaced persons from Kosmet went out on streets of Niš.
Danas
March 17: Cover: Jovica Ivić Still in Critical Condition Despite Operation.
March 18: Cover: (with a photo of the burned mosque) Bloody Clashes across 
Kosovo, Violence in Serbian Cities. Front part: Bloody Clashes Across Kosovo 
(p. 3); Mosque in Jevremova Street Burned (p. 4); Mosque Burned in Center of 
Niš, Too (p. 4).
March 19: Cover: Admiral Johnson: Violence in Kosovo Organized and Orches-
trated; Goran Svilanović: Ethnic Cleansing of Serbs Prepared; Drive of Alba-
nian Violence against Kosovo Serbs Continued Yesterday; Throwing Stones at 
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Novi Sad Theater, and Islamic Community. Middle: Ministry of Culture of Ser-
bia on Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo, Belgrade and Niš: Temple 
is Temple, no Matter to Whom It Belongs (p. 5); Police Accepts Responsibility 
for Mosque Burning (p. 5); Zukorlić: State Authorities Did Not Do Everything 
to Counter Vandalism; Protests All Around Serbia Last Night Also: Throwing 
Stones at Novi Sad Theatre, and Islamic Community (p. 5).
The newspapers continue to report in the days to come, e. g. Last Night Serbian 
Houses Burned across Kosmet: Kosovo Polje burned down (VN, March 20, 
cover), in front of us PoGrom, behind us hell (VN, March 20, p. 24–25), 
Hour by Hour Horror of Genocidal Pogrom of Serbs by Albanians which Started 
on 17 March Becomes Clearer: erAdiCAte everythinG serbiAn (VN, March 21, 
cover), serbs burned Alive (VN, March 21, p. 7), how lonG? Albanians Still 
Mercilessly Attacking Serbs (K, March 20, cover), TRAGEDY: In Five Days Al­
banians Ethnically Cleansed Ten Towns and Twenty Villages in Kosmet, Ser­
bian State Helpless (K, March 22, cover), Dramatic Confessions of Kosovo 
Serbs: horror And terror! (K, March 23, cover), AlbAniAns will AttACK bel-
GrAde (K, March 25, cover), POLICE DO NOT OBEY JOČIĆ!!! Mosque was 
Burned after Milan Obradović and Some Policemen Refused to Obey Orders (K, 
March 26, cover).
On March 20, the covers of Večernje novosti and Blic published photos of a 
student protest held in central Belgrade, during which protesters carried a huge 
slogan reading: New York – Madrid – Kosovo; the comment below the photo 
was: “MESSAGE: Belgrade students in yesterday’s protest with a slogan that 
was clearly informing the world that terrorism was also operating in Kosovo” 
(VN). Below this, on the cover of the same issue, it was announced that from 
that day on the paper will publish a new series of articles entitled: Terrorism – 
War without Warning (Serb.: Terorizam – rat bez objave). In Blic, an article on 
global terrorism was published on March 18 with the headline: “Who’s Next?” 
(p. 6). In the following days, Večernje novosti published articles about Osama 
bin Laden, Chechnya, Afghanistan, etc., thus directly linking the global ter-
rorist network with Kosovo and the Balkan Islamic network support. In that 
way, the violence in Kosovo acquired a new indexical meaning: it should not be 
looked upon just as ethnically motivated violence against Serbs but also as an act 
of global terrorism. In that discursive order, the Muslim Other was represented 
as a unified, criminalized, and threatening one.
By analysing this kind of rhetoric, one can notice that the rioters who at-
tacked Serbian civilians and churches in Kosovo were labelled as they and Al­
banians, Albanian extremists. On the whole, these acts were ethnically framed 
as “Albanian aggression against Serbs”. Moreover, they were connected to the 
global “Islamic” terrorists. This is a strategy of unification of the Other – a 
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distinctive marker that unites and homogenizes all different out-groups is their 
Muslim faith indirectly or directly associated with terrorism. The terms used 
to label the events in Kosovo were: pogrom, Crystal Night, ethnic cleansing, 
slaughter, terror, genocide, horror, hell, war; the most frequent labelling, how-
ever, was: pogrom. Thus, the news framed the events as acts of terrorism (war, 
terrorism, in a series of articles), crimes against humanity (ethnic cleansing, 
genocide, slaughter), and the events resembling the Second World War crimes 
(Crystal Night, pogrom).
The violent incidents in Serbia directed against Muslims and mosques were 
mainly depicted as a spontaneous revolt of outraged citizens, football hooligans, 
vandals or persons displaced from Kosovo whom the police failed to control. It 
is evident that these acts of Serbian violence were not ethnically framed as is the 
case with the Albanian violence against Serbs in Kosovo. By assigning the vio-
lent acts to the social subgroups (football hooligans, vandals), who have a repu-
tation for violent behaviour, or to disadvantaged groups (displaced persons), the 
media actually used the strategy of legitimizing (face-saving) “us”. The burning 
of the mosques and other objects was either referred to by de-agentivized or ge-
neric constructions or ascribed to an abstract agent such as passions.
Public sphere: resistance, silence, commemoration
Susan Gal (1995) defines the public sphere as a kind of legitimation of politi-
cal power. Following Bakhtin (1981) and Tsitstipis (1997), I take a “voice” to 
be a semantic and ideological position on the world, or so to say an interested 
position. As regards the public sphere, I distinguish between the “voice” of re-
sistance to the main policy, silence and commemorative practices. The burning 
was publicly condemned by politicians and church leaders, while the govern-
ment promised to restore the mosques. Still, the media and public figures clear-
ly underlined that this event was marginal, compared to the violence against the 
Serbs and the Orthodox religious facilities in Kosovo.
Notwithstanding, there were also “voices” which emphasized that the brutal 
violence in Kosovo should not have been an excuse for the violence in Serbia. 
A theatre director, Gorčin Stojanović, wrote a column in Blic on March 19 Ob­
jects of Hate, Subjects of Violence (Serb. Objekti mržnje, subjekti nasilja) saying 
that there was no excuse for the violence against civilians of Albanian ethnic-
ity or Muslim religion, or against Muslim religious facilities in Serbia, although 
Serbian churches in Kosovo were burned and Serbian civilians were expelled or 
killed (B, 19 March). In addition, some members of non-governmental organi-
zations condemned the incidents in Serbia, stressing that the crimes against the 
Serbs in Kosovo may be overshadowed by the violence which happened in Bel-
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grade, pointing at the persons close to the former Milošević regime who were 
still active (the Danas, March 23). Moreover, Vuk Drašković, once the oppo-
sition leader engaged against Milošević and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2004, stated in an interview that the burning of the Bajrakli Mosque was not a 
spontaneous act but an action organized by the veiled security structures, which 
were still connected to the defeated Milošević regime (“Mosque Burned by State 
Security Hand” B, March 26, p. 2–3).20 It was in accordance with the statements 
given by eyewitnesses who claimed that in the night of the arson there was a man 
dressed in civilian clothes who issued orders to the protesters, like: “Attack, but 
do not burn” (VN, March 19, p. 10).
The silence that surrounds the arson attacks against the mosques was reflect-
ed in the lack of public and political interest in completing the restoration of the 
mosques and in sentencing the accused, as the trial lasted for almost a decade. 
Indeed, when certain phenomena such as linguistic structures, cultural products, 
social groups, sociolinguistic varieties are made invisible, there is the ideologi-
cal strategy of erasure at work (Gal, Irvin 1995); the processes that index this 
erasure are fragmentation, marginalization, sublimation, and repression (Tsit-
sipis 2003: 548). The stories of Belgrade and Niš mosques, their demolition and 
restoration rarely appear in the Serbian press and if they do, they are marginal-
ised and fragmented. The story about the Bajrakli mosque emerges only sporadi-
cally and generally each March 18, when the destructive events are commemo-
rated. It also emerged in the reports on the trial of the accused for the arson, 
which was constantly delayed.
The trial of the 20 member group accused of participating in the riots in 
which the Bajrakli Mosque was set on fire began no sooner than five years after 
the events of 2004. However, it was immediately delayed, due to some techni-
cal and procedural problems.21 The key arguments of the prosecuting counsel 
were that the state authorities were responsible for the riots. The prosecution 
claimed that it had not been a spontaneous revolt and that it had been support-
ed and guided by some veiled state structures in order to provoke interethnic 
and religious hatred.22 The attorney of the Islamic community of Serbia, Ra-
jko Danilović, stated that the scenario of the mosque arson was similar to what 
happened during the violent riots following the Kosovo Albanian Government’s 
unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, when more than 
500 000 protesters gathered in the streets of Belgrade, and when small groups 
20 In Serbian original: “Džamiju palili prsti DB”.
21 Portal B92: see http://www6.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=06 & 
dd =11&nav_id=67745 (visited on 9. 2. 2015).
22 Diwan Magazine website: http://diwan-magazine.com/rajko-danilovic-ugledni-advokat-iz 
-beograda-dzamije-i-ambasade-je-palila-kostunicina-vlast/ (visited on 9. 2. 2015).
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of “football hooligans” attacked the embassies of the United States, Croatia, the 
United Kingdom, and Turkey as well as McDonald’s restaurants; the US embas-
sy was set on fire, while it took the police 45 minutes to arrive at the spot, and 
the fire was put out only then. During these protests, there were 30 injured, half 
of whom were policemen.23 On July 17, 2013 seven persons out of 11 accused for 
the mosque arson were found not guilty due to lack of evidence. The other three 
accused were found guilty for the violent behaviour during the riots, but not 
for setting the mosque alight. Thus, in the end of the process which lasted nine 
years, no one was found guilty for the arson of the Bajrakli Mosque. The Islamic 
community of Serbia and its attorney announced that they would lodge an ap-
peal.24 As regards the mosque in Niš, one person was sentenced to five months 
in prison for the torching of the mosque, seven received three-month sentences, 
while two were freed of all charges.25 The state (not-)acting in the legal sphere 
could thus be identified as a strategy of erasure.
In the years that followed, the March violence acquired a special place in the 
official Serbian memory. It has been called the March Pogrom and the Crys-
tal Night of Kosovo; both references making an explicit association between the 
Nazi persecutions against the Jews and the Albanian violence against the Serbs. 
The anniversary of the March violence in Kosovo has been regularly marked in 
the Serbian public and schools under the official term pogrom.26 Nevertheless, 
the commemoration of the mosque burning, which is marked each March 18 in 
Belgrade, is another “voice” to be heard. The initiator is the Islamic community 
of Serbia which tries to reconcile two poles of victimization. On the Day of the 
Mosques, the commemorative walk takes place in the streets of central Belgrade 
and ends in the courtyard of the Bajrakli Mosque. The walk is joined by reli-
gious leaders – Muslim, Christian, and Jewish, as well as by Belgrade citizens 
who wish to participate. It serves to evoke both March riots in Kosovo whith 
dozens of Orthodox churches being destroyed and the arson of the mosques in 
23 BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7259327.stm (visited on 9. 2. 2015).
24 Radio Slobodna Evropa website: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20 13 07 17/ 
50 0/500/.html?id=25049102; Kontrapress website:http://www.kontrapress.com/clanak.php 
?rub =Politika&url=Presuda-za-Bajrakli-dzamiju-vetar-u-ledja-huliganima (visited on 9. 2. 
2015).
25 Portal B92: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php ?yyyy =2009 &mm =03 &dd =16 &na 
vid =57871 (visited on 9. 2. 2015).
26 Cf. Radio Television of Serbia website: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru 
%C5 %A1tvo/1860903/%C5%A0kolski+%C4%8Das+posve%C4%87en+martovskom+po 
gro mu.html; http://www.time.rs/c/44a7ed77ca/ne-zaceljuju-martovske-rane.html (visited 
23. 1.  2015).
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Belgrade, Niš and Zvornik. Sometimes, it is followed by exhibitions and lectures 
in museums promoting religious tolerance.27
Conclusion
The paper analyzed the social context, the events, and the discourse related to 
the Albanian March violence against Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities in 
Kosovo in 2004, and the subsequent Serbian riots in Belgrade. The special em-
phasis was laid upon the events and the discourse which led to the burning of the 
only Belgrade mosque – Bajrakli Mosque. It was argued that the media provoked 
the spread of violence all over Serbia in a way similar to which the Albanian 
media provoked the March violence in Kosovo. The rioters who attacked Serbs 
and their churches in Kosovo were generalized as they, Albanians; the attacked 
were framed as victims and labelled: Serbs, everything Serbian, Kosovo, with 
an emphasis on women and children. On the other hand, the rioters who demol-
ished the mosques in Belgrade and Niš were dubbed football hooligans or van­
dals or else the incidents were described in impersonal and de-agentivised con-
structions. The destructive acts against the mosques were condemned, but they 
were rendered marginal in comparison to the violence in Kosovo. In addition, 
the media established a direct link between the events in Kosovo and the global 
“Islamic” terrorism. Therefore I argued that the media employed the strategy of 
unification of the (Muslim) Other. The Serbian media and politicians therefore 
tried to join the Western narrative of the War against Terrorism, in which the 
Muslim population is stereotyped and to some extent criminalized. In this man-
ner, the ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo was supposed to acquire a new 
indexical meaning as an act of global terrorism. However, in the times of cri-
sis, the unification of Other happens to be a very effective means in mobilizing 
people for violent actions. It was also at work recently, after the incidents at the 
football match between Serbia and Albania on October 16, 2014 when a series 
of attacks were launched against Albanian civilians in Serbia, and a series of at-
tacks against the Orthodox population in Albania.
By analyzing the public sphere with regard to the March violence, I dis-
tinguished between the resistance against the dominating policy, silence and 
commemorative practices. The “voices” which opposed the state policy insisted 
upon the responsibility of the Serbian authorities for the violent acts against the 
mosques and other Muslim facilities in Serbia. Otherwise, silence surrounded 
27 Blic: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Beograd/242457/Kad-hramovi-gore-to-je-zajednicka-trage dija 
(visited on 23. 1. 2015).
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the mosque arson; it was reflected in the lack of public, media and political in-
terest in completing the mosque restoration and in sentencing the accused. The 
trial lasted for almost a decade and resulted in the release of all the accused for 
the Belgrade mosque arson and the sentencing of one person for the Niš mosque 
arson. Obviously, there was a lack of political will on the part of Serbian authori-
ties to investigate and prosecute the responsible for the arson attacks against the 
mosques. As regards the commemoration, two commemorative practices have 
developed: the commemoration of the ‘March Pogrom’, organized by the Serbi-
an authorities and marked in the Serbian public and schools each 17th of March 
and the Day of the Mosques which is organized by the Islamic community of 
Serbia each 18th of March in the form of a commemorative walk through central 
Belgrade. These new commemorative practices emphasize even more the need 
to comparatively analyze the crisis management and the policy of commemora-
tion of all parties involved in an ethnopolitical conflict as this one.
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Appendix
The Serbian originals of the headlines cited in Table 1
Večernje novosti
(March 17) PUCNJAVOM NA PROTEST (cover), OPET PUCAJU NA DECU 
(p. 14); (March 18) SRBIJA NA NOGAMA (cover), Albanci krenuli na Srbe u 
Kosovskoj Mitrovici i drugim srpskim enklavama (cover), KOSMET U KRVI 
(cover), U protestima u Beogradu zapaljena džamija (below the small photo 
in the upper right corner on the cover), Na ulicama i huligani (p. 21). Za-
paljena Bajrakli džamija (p. 21), JURIŠ NA SVE SRPSKO (p. 24–25); (Spe-
cial issue VN, March 18) SRBIJA USTAJE (cover), Srpska ognjišta u plamenu 
(p. 6), Kosovska Mitrovica: CEO GRAD NA NOGAMA (p. 8–9), BEOGRAD 
JOŠ SPAVA (p. 11), U Beogradu zapaljena džamija: DŽAMIJA U PLAME-
NU (p. 12), U centru Niša, zbog događaja na Kosovu: ZAPALILI DŽAMIJU 
(p. 15); ( March 19) KOSOVO SE NE DA (cover), KRIVCI SE MORAJU NAĆI 
(p. 10), Strasti zapalile džamiju (p. 10); (March 20) Protekle noći gorele srp-
ske kuće širom Kosmeta: SPALJENO KOSOVO POLJE (cover), ISPRED PO-
GROM, IZA PAKAO (p. 24–25); (March 21) Svakog sata sve jasnija slika stra-
hota genocidnog pogroma Albanaca nad Srbima, započetog 17. marta: ZATRTI 
SVE SRPSKO (cover), SRBE ŽIVE SPALJIVALI (p. 7).
Blic
(March 17) Hiljade Srba u potestu (p. 10); (March 18) TEROR nad Srbima. Te-
rorizam Albanaca na Kosmetu; KrvAvi dAn nA Kosovu (p. 4–5); Solidarnost sa 
progonjenima (p. 12), Gorela Bajrakli džamija (p. 12); (March 19) GORI sve 
srpsko (cover), Ubijali, palili, tukli … (p. 2–3); Etničko čišćenje (p. 5), Spalili 
sve kuće, Srbi u zbegovima (p. 6–7), Demolirana i zapaljena Bajrakli džamija. 
Vandali štete samo Srbiji (p. 9), Vlada Srbije obnavlja Bajrakli džamiju (p. 9).
Kurir
(March 17) Glineni golubovi (p. 7); (March 18) RAT: U organizovanim napadi-
ma Albanaca na Srbe širom Kosova poginulo više od deset, a ranjeno skoro 300 
ljudi (cover); (March 18) Pokolj Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji. USTANI SRBIJO! 
(cover); DOSTA JE! (p. 2), POGROM SRBA! (p. 3), Vuk Drašković: VOJSKU 
NA KOSOVO! (p. 5), Lazarević: Oružjem na oružje (p. 5), Muftija: Zaštitite 
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Muslimane. Nismo mi krivi za ono što se događa Srbima, mi smo dobri građani 
(p. 6), Obradović: Policija kriva za paljenje Bajrakli džamije (p. 8), GENOCID! 
Srpka javnost ogorčena zbog linča na Kosmetu, ali listom osuđuje i paljenje 
islamskih svetinja (p. 12–13); (March 20–21) DOKLE? Albanci i dalje besomuč-
no napadaju Srbe (cover); (March 22) TRAGEDIJA: Albanci za pet dana etnički 
očistili deset gradova i dvadeset sela na Kosmetu, srpska država nemoćna (cov-
er); (March 23) Dramatična ispovest Srba sa Kosova: STRAVA I UŽAS! (cover); 
(March 25) ALBANCI KREĆU NA BEOGRAD (cover); (March 26) POLICIJA 
NE SLUŠA JOČIĆA!!! Džamija zapaljena pošto su Milan Obradović i deo poli-
cije odbili poslušnost (cover).
Politika
(March 17) Teško povređen Jovica Ivić, lead: Albanski esktremisti pucali iz va-
trenog oružja sa prigušvačem (p. A8); (March 18) U sukobima sedmoro poginu-
lih (cover), Nasilje pripremljeno. Albanskim ekstremistima ne odgovaraju prego-
vori (p. A8), Nekoliko hiljada građana protestvovalo ispred zgrade Vlade Srbije. 
Soldarnost sa Srbima na Kosmetu (last page), Povređeno desetak policajaca, za-
paljena džamija (last page); (March 19) Dan posle najvećeg nasilja na poslerat-
nom Kosmetu. Srbi u zebnji i strahu (cover), Kristalna noć na Kosovu i Metohi-
ji. Proleće srpskog očaja (p. A6), Bajrakli plamen (p. A6), Izgorela Islam-agina 
džamija. Veliki broj raseljenih sa Kosmeta izašao na ulice Niša (p. A9).
Danas
(March 17) Jovica Ivić u teškom stanju uprkos operaciji (cover); (March 18) Kr-
vavi sukobi na Kosovu, nasilje u gradovima Srbije (cover); (March 18) Krvavi 
sukobi na Kosovu, nasilje u gradovima Srbije (cover), Krvavi sukobi na Kosovu 
(p. 3), Zapaljena džamija u Jevremovoj (p. 4), Zapaljena džamija i u centru Niša 
(p. 4); (March 19) Admiral Džonson: Nasilje na Kosovu organizovano i orek-
strirano (cover), Goran Svilanović: Pripremano etničko čišćenje Srba (cover), 
Juče nastavljen talas albanskog nasilja nad kosovskim Srbima (cover), Kameno-
vani Novosadsko pozorište i Islamska zajednica (cover), Ministarstvo kulture 
povodom uništavanja kulturne baštine na Kosovu, u Beogradu i Nišu: Svetinja 
je svetinja, ma čija bila (p. 5), Policija prihvata odgovornost za paljenje džamije 
(p. 5), Zukorlić: Državni organi nisu učinili sve protiv vandalizma (p. 5), Širom 
Srbije i snoć protesti, i hapšenja, najveći neredi u Novom Sadu: Kamenovani No-
vosadsko pozorište i Islamska zajednica (p. 5).
